Limited, destructive and limited wars are important international events that impose a number of challenges on the countries concerned, except for simple victory or defeat. The most important of these challenges is the risk of escalation - be it within scope, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict.

In this book, Spencer d. Bakish is an important and negligent factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions.

Traditional warfare strategy assessments focus on the relationship between military and civilian populations, but Baksh believes that we must also take into account patterns of information flow between senior policymakers and all national security organizations. By studying the fate of US military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is collected, managed, analyzed and used, and the ability of the state to exercise power effectively in complex, dynamic international systems.

Using a combination of primary and secondary materials, the success and failure of limited war makes a timely and appropriate case for the power of information in war, with fundamental implications for the theory of international relations and the art of governance.